How do great artists create? How do brilliant scientists solve the hardest problems in their field? Listen to them try to explain and you'll probably be disappointed. Artists say mysterious things like: "The picture just formed in my mind." Writers tell us that: "I don't know where the words come from." Scientists say they: "Just had a hunch."

    Of course, not all scientists, artists and writers give such mysterious answers. Some talk about the processes they went through or what inspired their conceptual jump. But their explanations are almost invariable unsatisfying. They usually can't really explain how they made that vital leap of the imagination. This is strange. Why is it that otherwise brilliant and articulate people seem unable to adequately explain their thought processes? Don't they know how they did it?

    What is true of great scientific and artistic leaps of imagination is also true in everyday life. When people are asked why they chose one career over another, one partner over another or one flavour of ice-cream over another, the same problems emerge. Often, people's answers are unconvincing or they just don't know.

    Psychologists no longer find this inability to explain our internal mental processes strange. Like Freud all those years ago, modern cognitive psychologists have come to accept that a lot of the time we don't have much of a clue what's going on in our own minds, and there's evidence to prove it.

    Mysterious thoughts

    In a classic review of the literature, Nisbett and Wilson （1977） looked at many, many cognitive and social psychology studies conducted in the 1960s, 70s and earlier. These studies involved manipulating participants' behaviour. For an example, have a look at my report of this classic study of cognitive dissonance.

    After reviewing all these studies where experimenters are messing with participants' minds, Nisbett and Wilson came to the following conclusions:

    1. People are mostly unaware that their behaviour or thought processes have been changed by the experimenter.

    2. Even if they are aware of the manipulation, they can't identify the process of change that occurred.

    3. Most people cannot connect their changed thought or behaviour with the experimenter's manipulation.

    Frustratingly, it seems that the most powerful workings of the mind are hidden away from view, even when we go rummaging around. If this is true, what about the explanations that people actually give for their behaviour? Where do these come from and are they ever right?

    Nisbett and Wilson reach two further disturbing conclusions:

    1. When coming up with their explanations, people don't seem to access the correct thought process（es）. If they do then it only happens when the explanation is plausible.

    2. Sometimes people do report the correct reason for what they've done, but it's probably only a coincidence.

    If Nisbett and Wilson are right it has profound implications for what we can know about our own thoughts and whether we can believe what other people say about theirs.

    The evidence

    In the next few posts I'll explain some of the evidence for these claims. But in the meantime think about a relatively common experience like driving. Most drivers have had the experience of having driven for a length of time without noticing any traffic signals, yet they still stop at every red light.

    Some part of our minds has clearly been paying attention and it's these automatic unconscious processes that are keeping us alive. But there's a major difference between being on automatic pilot because it suits us, and being unable to get off automatic pilot even if we want to.

    It's this idea of not having access to the vast majority of our own thoughts, even when we try, that has been such a major psychological insight for modern cognitive psychologists.

    This post is part of a series on the hidden workings of our unconscious:

    1. ? The Hidden Workings of Our Minds

    2. Our Secret Attitude Changes

    3. Why Problem Solving Itself is a Puzzle, Even to Poincare and Picasso

    4. What We Don't Know About Shopping, Reading, Watching TV and Judging People

    5. When We Are Fools to Ourselves

    6. At the Heart of Attraction Lies Confusion: Choice Blindness

    References

    Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. （1977）. Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84（3）, 231-259.

    那些偉大的藝術家是怎樣進行創(chuàng)作的？那些卓越的科學家是如何解開一個個謎團的？他們對此做出的解釋可能會讓那你失望。那些藝術家是這樣解釋這件神奇的事情："那些畫面就出現在我腦子里了。"作家告訴我們："我也不知道這些次從哪兒來的。"科學家說他們"就是有這么個直覺".

    當然，并不是所有的科學家，藝術家和作家都能給出這樣的玄乎的答案。有些人會敘述他們產生這些想法的過程，或者是什么東西激發(fā)他們的靈感。但是他們的解釋大都不能令人滿意。通常而言，他們很難真正解釋出他們產生想法的重要步驟。這是件很奇怪的是兒。那些邏輯清晰成就非凡的人怎么就不能充分的解釋他們的思維過程呢？他們怎么會不知道他們是怎樣取得那些成就的呢？

    那些發(fā)生在偉大科學家和藝術家身上飛躍的想象力同時也發(fā)生在每個人的日常生活中。當人們被問到他們?yōu)槭裁磿�選擇某一種職業(yè)，選擇某一種圖案或某一種口味的冰激凌而不選擇另外一種的時候，就會出現同樣的問題。通常，人們的回答是難以置信的，或者他們本人也無法解釋。

    心理學家發(fā)現，無法解釋內部思維過程的現象很普遍。就像很多年前佛洛伊德那樣，現代認知心理學已經開始接受在大部分情況下，我們沒有足夠的線索來解釋和證明我們的思維是怎樣的。

    不可思議的思維

    經典文獻中，Nisbett（尼斯貝特）和Wilson（威爾森）（1977）對六、七十年代甚至更早的認知和社會心理學文獻進行了回顧，其中包括對被試行為控制的研究�？梢詤⒖嘉易珜懙年P于這一經典研究的報告：認知不一致。

    回顧之前那些主試妨礙被試思維的實驗研究，尼斯貝特和威爾森得出如下結論：

    1. 人們大都無法意識到他們的行為和思想被主試改變了。

    2. 即便他們意識到自己被控制了，他們也不能分辨出干涉的出現。

    3. 很多人不能將他們思想和行為的改變同主試的控制聯(lián)系起來。

    令人失望的是，即便我們再怎么努力找，思維中的很多重要工作依舊是難以被察覺的。如果真的是這樣，那又怎么解釋行為的來源呢？而且這些行為還經常是正確的。

    尼斯布特和威爾森得出兩條令人不安的結論：

    1. 當我們進行解釋的時候，人們似乎并沒有進入正確的思維過程。只有看上去可信的時候，他們才試圖去解釋。

    2. 有些時候，人們能報告他們行為的真正原因，但是這些解釋仿佛都是巧合而已。

    如果尼斯布特和威爾森是對的，這就更深入的暗示了我們能對我們的思維了解多少，以及我們是不是能相信別人關于他們自己思維的解釋。

    證據

    接下來我將解釋幾個能支持這些論斷的證據。與此同時，你可以想像一下一個相關的普通經歷，比如開車。許多司機都有開了很長時間車都沒注意過交通標志的經歷，但他們依舊在紅燈前停車。

    可以確信我們思維中的有些部分是自動集中注意的，這些無意識的過程保證我們能安全活著。然而，這同自動駕駛儀還是有很大區(qū)別的，因為這些思維是我們的一部分，即便我們想擺脫自動駕駛儀，也是不可能的。

    即便嘗試，我們也無法進入自己的絕大多數思維的想法成為了當代人之心理學家所關注的心理學問題。

    以下是潛意識的秘密工作系列的一部分

    1. 潛意識的秘密工作

    2. 態(tài)度的悄悄改變

    3. 為什么即便對于彭加萊和畢加索而言，解決問題本身是一個謎

    4. 我們在購物，閱讀，看電視和評價他人的時候有什么是不知道的

    5. 當我們把自己當傻瓜

    6. 迷惑背后的吸引力：盲目選擇

    參考文獻

    Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. （1977）. Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84（3）, 231-259.